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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
suggested that the omnibus-motion approach of CPLR 3211(e)
is not overridden by the compromise with respect to 3211(a) (7)
and, therefore, motions pursuant to 3211(a) (7) should be made at
the time other 3211(a) motions are made. Consequently, it is
submitted that "any subsequent time" should be construed to mean
any subsequent time after answer.
CPLR 3215: One year period in third-party action runs from
judgment against third-party plaintiff in main action.
In Multari v. Glalin Arns Corp.,73 a wrongful death action,
the defendant, an owner and general contractor, served a third-
party summons and complaint for contractual and implied in-
demnification on Krugman Construction Corporation (Krugman),
the deceased's employer. Since Krugman had not yet answered
one month prior to the trial the defendant advised Krugman to
notify its insurance carrier about the impending trial, and enclosed
certain pleadings, but Krugman did not appear. Shortly before
the trial, Krugman was given notice of its default but this notice
was also ignored.
Subsequent to a judgment rendered against the defendant for
failure to provide plaintiff with a safe place to work, the court
granted a default judgment to defendant against Krugman, based
on the negligent manner in which it covered the opening through
which plaintiff fell.
On motion in supreme court, special term, the default was
vacated"7 on the ground that CPA § 193 (a), in effect when the
third-party complaint was served, did not require Krugman to
answer the third-party complaint.7 ' The court allowed the third-
party plaintiff to serve a supplemental complaint, to which Krug-
man was directed to answer, indicating that a new trial was
necessary to resolve the issue of indemnity.
Reversing, the appellate division, second department, held, that
the third-party answer, despite the statutory words "may answer,"
was mandatory under CPA § 193(a) and reinstated the original
default judgment.76
The appellate division was then presented with the contention
tfiat the default judgment was invalid since it had been entered
more than three years after the third-party complaint was served.
CPLR 3215(c) provides that if judgment is not entered within
7328 App. Div. 2d 122, 282 N.Y.S.2d 782 (2d Dep't 1967).
7451 Misc. 2d 1019, 274 N.Y.S2d 827 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1966).
7 CPA § 193(a) stated that the third-party defendant "may answer"
the third-party complaint. Contrast with this the mandatory wording of
CPLR 1008, "[tihe third-party defendant shall answer the [third-party]
claim. . . "
71Multari v. Glalin Arms Corp., 28 App. Div. 2d 122, 282 N.Y.S.2d
782 (2d Dep't 1967).
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one year from date of default, the court, in the absence of a
showing of sufficient cause, shall dismiss the complaint as aban-
doned. Reasoning that the purpose of third-party practice is to
expedite the termination of an action, the court held that the one
year period for entering a default judgment in a third-party action
commences when the judgment against the defendant in the main
action is rendered, since the cause of action in indemnity does not
accrue until then.
As one commentator has noted,77 any other result than that
reached by the court, would be impractical, if not impossible. Any
damages to which the third-party plaintiff may be entitled are
not ascertainable and nonrecoverable until after judgment is rend-
ered against the third-party plaintiff. If the one year period were
to commence from the return date of the answer, the result
would be to require a third-party plaintiff to prove a case in which
no loss has been or may be incurred by him.78
ARTICLE 50- JUDGMENTS GENERALLY
CPLR 5013: Evasive tactics may allow dismissal on merits before
close of plaintiff's case so as to bar second suit.
CPLR 5013 is the seminal provision for the determination
of whether a judgment dismissing a cause of action is on the
merits and, thus, a bar to any subsequent action. It provides,
in part, that unless expressly specified otherwise, the dismissal of
a cause of action before the close of the proponent's case is not a
dismissal on the merits. Usually, the problem will not arise, since
the courts are loathe to dismiss on the merits before the pro-
ponent's proof is complete, especially where the grounds for dis-
missal are technical.7 9  Additionally, the mere statement that the
dismissal is on the merits or with prejudice is not conclusive as
to whether the second action is barred. Either the circumstances
in the prior-*action must warrant the conclusion that the dismissal
is on the merits, or it must be clear that the trial court intended
such a result.80 For example, in Mink v. Keim.,8' the plaintiff
77See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3215, supp. commentary 237 (1967).
75 An additional aspect of the present case is that, under certain factual
conditions, the five-day notice prerequisite to a CPLR 3215 motion may
be ignored. The court here found that such a formality would not be
mandated when the third-party defendant has disregarded all prior notices,
including one advising him of possible default.
79 Greenberg v. DeHart, 4 N.Y2d 511, 151 N.E.2d 891, 176 N.Y.S.2d
344 (1958); Richard v. American Union Bank 253 N.Y. 166, 170 N.E.
532 (1930); Jones v. Merit Truck Renting Corp., 17 App. Div. 2d 779,
232 N.Y.S.2d 519 (lst Dep't 1962).
80 5 WEINsTmN, KoRn & MILLER, NEw YORK CIVIL PRAcTIcE t 5013.02
(1965).81291 N.Y. 300, 52 N.E.2d 444 (1943).
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